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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD JAMES, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
WAYNE R. PRESTON, ZIONS 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A, 
GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 20407 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff objects to defendant's Statement of Facts. 
Defendant only cites those portions of the record that support 
his version of what transpired between these two parties, and 
totally omits the other evidence. 
The evidence before the trial court consisted of 
Preston's and others' testimony at trial and James' 
deposition, which was published in lieu of his appearance at 
trial pursuant to court order. (R.62) 
James denies Preston's testimony that after he handed 
a $10,000.00 cashier's check to Preston he •. . . give (sic) 
it right back to him." (R. 158, Trial transcript, p. 5) James 
testified that he delivered a $10,000.00 cashier's check to 
Preston, which was endorsed by him (R. 33, James' 
deposition, Ex. 2) and deposited by Preston into an escrow 
account to extend the option to purchase the real property the 
parties anticipated acquiring. (R. 33, James deposition p. 
14-15) James also denies that the Trust Deed was signed 
blank, without a notary present, as claimed by Preston, but 
that it was signed at Zions Bank (R. 33, James1 deposition, 
p. 8) He also testified it was intended as security for the 
$10,000. (R. 33, James1 deposition, p. 7) It is undisputed 
that James, who was named as Trustee and Beneficiary on the 
trust Deed was not qualified to act as such under §57-1-21 
U.C.A. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7) 
The court did not make any findings as to whose 
version was truthful but found that the trust deed was " . . . 
defective and of no legal force or effect" (R.150), and that 
the debt was discharged by the bankruptcy proceedings. (R. 
150-152) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ISSUE OF EQUITABLE MORTGAGE WAS BEFORE THE COURT. 
District courts have general equity powers, and 
plaintiff's claim is one seeking an exercise of that power. 
James1 complaint specifically requested a ". 
judgment of foreclosure foreclosing out all rights of 
defendants in and to said realty and for an Order of Sale 
i 
treating said Trust Deed as a mortgage and for the entry of 
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such other orders as are necessary and just to foreclose out 
all of defendants1 interest in said realty." (R.2) 
At trial, counsel for James stated: "and the trust 
deed can be deemed a mortgage, and therefore it does have some 
security valuation." (R. Trial transcript, p.44) 
Plaintiff raised a number of issues any one of which, 
if the trial judge believed him, would have been sufficient to 
find the deed invalid. However, there were no findings 
entered by the trial judge which would indicate why he found 
the deed invalid. Preston claimed at trial it was invalid 
because it was signed in blank; not signed in front of a 
notary; was induced by misrepresentations; lacked 
consideration and that the Trustee wasn't a member of the Utah 
Bar (R. 158 Trial transcript, p.42) 
James strongly disputes all of these allegations 
except that as Trustee he was not qualified to act as such. 
Counsel for James stated there were problems with the Trust 
Deed: 
Mr. McRAE: I admit the Trust Deed says what it 
says, the title report. I do submit, however -
and the reason that I proceeded in the 
fashion that I did is because of the problems 
with the Trust Deed which, pursuant to Sec. 
57-1-23 can be the subject of a foreclosure 
action which, because of the beneficiary 
purportedly being the trustee did create some 
problems and so I deemed it a mortgage and 
proceeded in that fashion." 
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James1 counsel's statements at trial and the prayer 
of the Complaint seeking "such other orders as are necessary 
and just" to foreclose defendant's interest in the real 
property are sufficient to invoke the court's equitable powers 
to impress an equitable mortgage on the property. 
POINT II 
AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE MAY EXIST IF PLAINTIFF'S 
VERSION OF THE FACTS IS TRUE. 
James agrees with the statement in Preston's brief 
that in order to find the existence of an equitable mortgage, 
the court must find that the purpose and intent of the parties 
was to create a security interest. Preston argues he never 
received the $10,000.00. James strongly disputes this. It 
is unclear from the trial judge's Findings of Fact why he 
considered the Trust Deed defective. 
If this court finds that an equitable mortgage could 
have been imposed on the property, if the requisite intent and 
consideration were present, despite irregularities in the deed 
itself, this matter should be remanded to the trial court to 
enter a finding as to why it found the Trust Deed defective. 
POINT III 
IT IS UNCLEAR FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT WHY THE TRIAL 
COURT FOUND THE TRUST DEED DEFECTIVE. 
Preston's argument in Point III is that the findings 
of a trial court are presumed to be valid. However/ it is 
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unclear what the court's basis was for finding the Trust Deed 
invalid. If it was because of the fact James was not 
qualified to act as Trustee, the Court could still have found 
an equitable mortgage, and the matter should be remanded for a 
clarification of that issue. 
POINT IV 
THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS DO NOT DISCHARGE AN 
EQUITABLE LIEN. 
If it is determined that even though the deed was 
invalid, that an equitable mortgage was created, such a 
security interest is not discharged in the bankruptcy 
proceedings. In Garnett State Sav. Bank v. Tush, 232 Kan 447, 
657 P. 2d 508 (Kan. 1983), as was pointed out in James1 
original brief, he did not have to file an adversary 
proceeding, but a security interest, such as equitable liens, 
pass through the bankruptcy case, unaffected unless an 
adversary proceeding is held to determined the validity of the 
lien. It is not the responsibility of the secured creditors 
to file the adversary proceeding. As was pointed out in In Re 
Honaker, 4 B.R. 415 (B.C.E.D. Mich. 1980) the legislative 
history of Sec. 506 (d) makes this clear (quoted in Footnote 
4, p. 13, appellant's brief). Plaintiff may still look to the 
secured property even though he is precluded from a personal 
judgment against defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
This court should find that an equitable mortgage may 
be an appropriate remedy in this case, and that if it exists, 
that it was not discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings. 
Since the Findings of Fact entered by the trial judge do not 
indicate upon what grounds he found the Trust Deed to be 
invalid and of no force and effect, the case should be 
remanded for such a clarification. If the grounds were that 
the trustee was not a member of the Utah bar, or some other 
irregularity, then the trial judge should enter findings 
regarding the other factual issues in dispute, i.e. was 
consideration given; did the parties intend to create a 
security interest; was the execution of the Trust Deed 
procured by misrepresentation. 
Respectfully submitted this f'foL day of July, 1985. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Jp*ANN 'B. STRINGHAM 
Attorney for Appellant 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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